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Abstract.  The constitution of the Roman Republic featured a system of checks and balances that 
would eventually influence the American founders, yet it had very different characteristics from 
the system of separation of powers that the founders created.  The Roman senate gave advice but 
did not legislate; the people voted directly on bills and appointments in popular assemblies; and a 
group of magistrates, led by a pair of consuls, proposed bills, brought prosecutions, served as 
judges, led military forces, and performed other governmental functions.  This paper analyzes the 
Roman constitution from the perspective of agency theory, and argues that the extensive checks 
and balances, which were intended to prevent the recurrence of monarchy, may have gone too far.  
Suitable for an earlier period in which the population was small and the political class was 
homogenous, the constitution proved unworkable when Rome acquired a vast, diverse empire.  
The lessons of Roman constitutionalism for the American constitution are also discussed. 
 
 
 The Roman Republic, which is conventionally dated from 509 to 27 B.C.,2 had an 
unwritten constitution that controlled its political system.  The constitution established a series of 
institutions (such as the senate) and offices (such as the two consulships), and defined their 
powers; it determined the rights of citizens and eligibility for citizenship; it addressed the role of 
religion in public life; it specified proceedings for lawmaking and adjudication.  There was no 
formal amendment procedure, so constitutional norms changed frequently and often 
imperceptibly (as in Britain), and the constitution evolved a great deal over almost five hundred 
years.  But there was a fair degree of continuity, and ancient authors recognized the difference 
between constitutional norms and other legal and political norms, making modern identification 
of a Roman constitution possible. 
 
 The modern scholarship on the Roman constitution is mainly descriptive and historical, 
with some speculation about how particular norms may have contributed to the prosperity and 
stability of the Republic, and others may have contributed to its collapse.  Historians generally 
observe that Roman constitutional norms mediated between an upper class and the masses, and 
distributed executive power among multiple offices in order to forestall a return to the 
monarchical system that existed in the sixth century B.C.  No one has tried to analyze the Roman 
constitution within a modern political economy framework, however, and the purpose of this 
paper is to develop such an analysis. 
 
 The central idea of this framework is that of agency costs.  Constitutions do many things 
but all constitutions manage agency costs.  The people (the principal) assign government 
officials (the agents) the task of supplying public goods and redistributing wealth.  The agents 
                                                 
1 University of Chicago Law School.  Thanks to Jacob Gersen, Martha Nussbaum, Josh Ober, Richard Posner, 
Matthew Stephenson, Adrian Vermeule, and participants at a conference at the University of Chicago Law School, 
for helpful comments, and to Greg Pesce for research assistance.  Special thanks to John Ferejohn who delivered 
very helpful formal comments at that conference. 
2 Historians disagree about the precise date.  Augustus became Emperor in 27 B.C., but the end of the Republic 
could be dated as early as the unconstitutional dictatorship of Sulla in 81, or the dictatorships of Caesar in the 40s. 
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have interests that are not fully aligned with those of the people; the purpose of a constitution is 
to give agents incentives to act in the interests of the people, that is, to minimize agency costs.  A 
large literature discusses the way that elections, judicial review, separation of powers, and other 
modern political institutions may (or may not) minimize agency costs.3  I address the Roman 
constitution from this perspective, examining ways that Roman institutions might have 
minimized agency costs that existed in the ancient world.  I do not claim that the Roman 
constitutional system was optimal or efficient; my more modest goal is to describe ways in 
which the system may have addressed the problem of agency costs, albeit frequently in imperfect 
or questionable ways. 
 
 The most notable feature of the Roman system from a modern perspective was the 
elaborate set of precautions against the accumulation of executive power in a single person.  The 
goal was to prevent the recurrence of monarchy but the risk of checks and balances is that they 
paralyze governance.  I argue that gridlock did not occur during the Republic’s first four 
centuries because the population was relatively small and homogenous, so political agents could 
bargain around the institutional checks and balances when necessary for the sake of public 
security.  But as conquered foreign populations streamed into the city, the population became 
large and heterogeneous.  Most of the fabulous wealth resulting from conquest enriched the 
elites, not ordinary people, resulting in divergence of interests between the upper and lower 
classes.  Governance became subject to gridlock, setting the stage for extra-constitutional 
behavior in the last century and eventually dictatorship. 
 
 There are three reasons why such an analysis contributes to the literature.  First, 
classicists have been cautious about speculating about the functions of the Roman constitution 
because of the paucity of sources.  Nonetheless, they have tried to make inferences which reflect 
informal rational choice reasoning but without, as far as I can tell, any knowledge of the vast 
modern literature on political economy.  One purpose of this paper is to bring to bear recent ideas 
from one discipline on the discussions of specialists in another. 
 
 Second, the Roman constitution has influenced modern political institutions.  American 
revolutionaries (and, subsequently, French revolutionaries) were obsessed with ancient Rome.4  
References to the heroes and villains of ancient Rome are ubiquitous in founding-era pamphlets, 
letters, orations, and books.  Publius wrote the Federalist Papers, the veterans of the 
Revolutionary War created the Society of Cincinnatus, etc., etc.  A more fine-grained 
understanding of the Roman constitution will contribute to our understanding of the founders’ 
constitutional thinking and to constitutional theory in general. 
 
 Third, modern constitutional legal theory has taken a comparative turn, and a new, rich 
literature has produced rigorous accounts of foreign constitutions, often from the perspective of 
rational choice.5  One benefit of this approach is that it helps stimulate ideas for constitutional 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003). 
4 See CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME, AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 
12-38 (1994). 
5 See, e.g., ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 
(2009); CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (STEFAN VOIGT ED. 2005); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The 
Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism (unpub. m.s., 2010). 
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design and evolution in the United States.  The Roman constitution provides a fresh example, 
which is notable because of its stark differences from modern constitutional systems. 
 
 Before I turn to the analysis, I need to offer more than the usual number of caveats.  The 
secondary literature contains many internal disagreements about the meaning of sources, which 
are themselves extremely sparse and not always to be trusted.  Only the final years of the 
Republic are well-documented, thanks in large part to Cicero’s private letters to his friends, and 
the survival of speeches and other contemporary materials.  For earlier periods, historians rely 
mainly on Polybius, who was a foreigner with a foreign perspective and a particular ideological 
and philosophical agenda; Livy, who relied on earlier historical sources that are now lost, and, 
writing in the Augustan age, needed to avoid making claims that would have displeased 
Augustus; and mostly ambiguous archeological evidence.  Augustus, Rome’s first emperor, and 
later republicans like Cicero idealized the old days and emphasized the decadence of the late 
republic period—Cicero to justify a return to an era supposedly dominated by the elites, 
Augustus to justify his abolition of late republican institutions. 
 
 In order to make progress with a political economy analysis, I will have to engage in 
extreme simplification.  My claims about Roman constitutional norms should all be taken in this 
spirit; because I will not reproduce the controversies in the literature, interested readers will need 
to consult the sources. 
 
 On top of the problem of interpreting old sources that could be self-serving and that are 
rife with gaps, there is the problem of interpreting an unwritten constitution.  Even with a 
modern system such as Britain’s, it is never entirely clear when a norm is constitutional or 
merely legal.  In such cases, claims about the meaning of the constitution are hard to separate 
from ideological or self-interested wishful thinking—as is, of course, even the case with written 
constitutions.  However, that Rome did have a constitution, and that Romans themselves 
believed themselves to have a constitution, is not open to serious doubt6—at least, until the last 
century of its existence.7 
 
 In addition, it is impossible to identify a single Roman constitution over the five hundred 
year period of the Roman Republic.8  There was significant change and disruption during this 
period.  During its last century, the Republic was in a state of nearly continuous crisis and 
sometimes civil war.  The secondary sources that describe the Roman constitution focus on the 
third and second centuries B.C., when the political order was relatively stable, while also 
identifying norms that persisted over time and some historical variation during other periods, 
especially the final fifty years.  I follow them but deemphasize the historical variation, which is 
complex and elusive.9 
 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., T. Corey Brennan, Power and Process Under the Republican “Constitution,” in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 31 (Harriet I. Flower ed. 2004). 
7 See Ronald Syme, THE ROMAN REVOLUTION 15 (1939) (calling the Roman constitution in its last century a “sham” 
behind which a group of powerful families exercised power). 
8 Cf. Harriet Flower, ROMAN REPUBLICS (2009). 
9 I rely mainly on Andrew Lintott, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC (1999), whose description of the 
Roman constitution is both comprehensive and modern, and Frank Frost Abbott, A HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF 
ROMAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (1901). 
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I.  A Thumbnail Sketch of the Roman Constitution 
 
 The U.S. constitution embodies a system of separation of powers, with a presidency that 
executes the laws, a Congress that legislates, and a judiciary that interprets the laws.  Federalist 
structures guarantee some autonomy for states.  The source of authority is the people who can 
amend the constitution by following prescribed procedures.  The Roman system is quite 
different.  Most scholarly discussions divide it into three main elements: the senate, the 
magistrates, and the assemblies.  The senate is politically important as the locus for political 
discussion but has mainly advisory powers in a formal sense.  The magistrates have the major 
executive and administrative powers, but also serve as judges, and initiate legislation by 
summoning assemblies of the people and submitting bills to them for their approval.  The people, 
acting in assemblies, pass bills, elect magistrates, and serve certain judicial functions.  Roman 
provinces had no autonomy but were governed by representatives of the government.  Table 1 
provides an overview of the Roman Constitution as it existed in the mid- to late Republic.  The 
information provided is approximate, and will be discussed in more detail in the text below. 
 
 
Table 1: The Roman Constitution 
Institution Eligibility Term Powers 
Senate Former 
magistrate; 
good 
character 
Lifetime Advisory; finances 
Magistrates 
(number by 
end of 
Republic) 
Consul (2) Former 
praetor 
One year Military command; head of state; power to 
convene assemblies and propose legislation 
Praetor (16) Former 
quaestor 
One year Military command; judicial authority; power to 
convene assemblies and propose legislation 
Quaestor 
(40) 
Citizen One year Public finances; assistants to other magistrates; 
power to convene assemblies and propose 
legislation; public prosecutors 
Tribune 
(10) 
Plebeian One year Power to convene assemblies and propose 
legislation; intercessio 
Plebeian 
Aedile (2) 
Plebeian One year Public infrastructure, games 
Curule 
Aedile (2) 
Citizen One year Public infrastructure, games 
Censor (2) Citizen Five years Maintaining census; enrolling senate; public 
contracts 
Dictator Citizen Six months Maintaining order in emergencies; appointed on an 
ad hoc basis 
Assemblies Centuriate Citizen Ad hoc General legislation; elected consuls, praetors, and 
censors; capital trials 
Tribal Citizen Ad hoc General legislation; elected other magistrates; 
trials 
Plebeian Plebeian Ad hoc General legislation; trials 
 
 
A.  The Senate 
 
6 
 
 The senate was the central institution in Roman politics, but its formal powers were few.  
It did not pass legislation or appoint magistrates, for example.  As a matter of formal 
constitutional law, the senate was mainly an advisory institution whose members received 
delegations, digested reports, debated, and issued decrees, which were not legally binding.10  
Nonetheless, in practice the senate had a considerable degree of authority during most of its 
existence.  Over the last one hundred years of the Republic, the senate lost power to magistrates 
with popular followings.11 
 
 The senate’s decrees did not have formal legal force, but they frequently guided 
subsequent legislation enacted by the plebeian assembly, which was the main legislative body.12  
Magistrates needed the support of the senate because the senate consisted of important, 
experienced men.13  The senate also provided a forum in which the magistrates divided authority 
among each other so as to avoid jurisdictional conflicts.14  The senate received delegations from 
foreign countries and negotiated treaties with them, and had a significant role in public 
finances.15 
 
 Magistrates summoned the senate for meetings and set the agenda.16  A magistrate made 
a proposal and asked the senate’s advice.  Senators were supposed to debate the issue presented 
by the magistrate but could digress.  Filibusters were possible because the meeting had to be 
ended at nightfall.  Eventually, the presiding magistrate called for a vote on his proposal (for 
example, that a decree be issued), and the senators voted for or against.  The motion could be 
vetoed by a tribune or a magistrate of equal or greater rank.  If a decree survived the veto, it was 
recorded. 
 
 The membership of the senate varied over time, but it was always in the hundreds.  
Because senators were often absent, meetings could take place in the low hundreds.17  Senators 
were not subject to a formal property qualification but probably had to have substantial property 
(or belong to a family that did) in order to hold office.18  For one thing, they were not paid and 
were barred from commercial activities.19  For another, they were drawn from the ranks of 
magistrates (also unpaid), who needed substantial resources to win electoral campaigns and 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Lintott, supra, at 66 (describing the senate as an advisory, rather than administrative body, which 
primarily debated issues and advised the magistrates). 
11 MARY T. BOATWRIGHT, DANIEL J. GARGOLA, & RICHARD J.A. TALBERT, THE ROMANS: FROM VILLAGE TO 
EMPIRE 136 (2004). 
12 Brennan, supra, at 62; see also Lintott, supra, at 87-88. 
13 See Lintott, supra, at 86 (describing the senate as a “repository of accumulated experience of political office and 
military command”). 
14 This was particularly important because different magistrates were not required to act in unison and colleagues 
frequently sought to obstruct the work of other magistrates.  See Lintott, supra, at 100-101.  
15 See Abbott, supra, at 234-39. 
16 For an overview of the procedures governing debates, as well as the lawmaking process more generally, in the 
Republican era, see id. at 225-32; see also Lintott, supra, at 75-85. 
17 The number of senators who served at any particular time is unknown.  Records of quorum calls and senate votes 
suggest that there were typically between 150 and 500 senators.  See Lintott, supra, at 68-70 
18 See Lintott, supra, at 68-72. 
19 Senators were generally barred from pursuing occupations that placed a “moral stigma” on the individual, such as 
gladiatorial combat or acting.  Senators were also generally barred from holding occupations that paid paid a salary 
or wage, or which required the constant personal attention of a senator.  See Abbott, supra, at  223. 
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discharge some of their duties (for example, aediles were expected to finance the games).20  
Senators were appointed by consuls earlier in the Republic and by censors later in the Republic.  
As noted, they were typically ex-magistrates.  Censors determined that an individual possessed 
good moral character before appointing him to the senate; censors could also remove senators 
who had engaged in gross moral turpitude, including serious crimes.  Otherwise, senators served 
for life.21 
 
B.  Offices 
 
 Day-to-day governance occurred through the magistrates.  The major magistrates were 
the consuls, praetors, tribunes, aediles, and censors.  Each office had more than one occupant, as 
discussed below.  Each type of magistrate possessed authority over a different area of life; their 
authority included executive, legislative, and judicial powers, as we understand them today.22  
Madison, following Montesquieu, warned that breach of separation of powers was a recipe for 
tyranny.23  But the Roman magistrates were subject to significant checks.  Their terms were 
short; they were elected by the people (in most cases); they had to obtain the approval of the 
people for certain actions such as legislation; they could be tried and punished for abuse of their 
office after their term has expired; and they were constantly subject to public scrutiny because 
they had to act publicly in most cases.24  They could act independently but some amount of 
cooperation was necessary so that they did not undermine each other’s actions; in addition, 
magistrates could veto actions of other magistrates of equal or lesser rank as long as the vetoing 
magistrate was present.25  All of the magistracies were open to plebeians as well as patricians by 
the mid-Republic.26  Magistrates could and often did simultaneously serve as senators, akin to 
the parliamentary system and unlike the American system of separation of powers.27 
 
1.  The Magistracies: Powers 
 
a.  Consuls 
 
 The chief magistrate was the consul.  In fact, two consuls were in office at the same time.  
The consul’s term was one year.  Until Sulla reformed the office in 81 B.C., the consul’s major 
role was as military commander.  Thus, the two consuls would leave the city in order to conduct 
military campaigns.28  Before leaving the city and after returning to the city, the consul 
performed a number of civilian functions.  He might conduct elections of other officials such as 
censors; he might discuss issues in the senate; he might propose legislation; he might preside 
                                                 
20 Abbott, supra, at 222. 
21 Lintott, supra, at 71-72. 
22 Indeed, some scholars argue that different government activities were spread across different magistrates in order 
to avoid conflicts between magistrates.  See Lintott, supra, at 100. 
23 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
24 See, e.g., Abbott, supra, at 167-73 (discussing the electoral limits, qualifications, and other constraints on 
magistrates); see also Lintott, supra, at 99-102 (describing the province system as a means for controlling the 
powers of consuls). 
25 Boatwright, supra, at 137. 
26 Abbott, supra, at 167. 
27 See, e.g., Lintott, supra, at 68 (noting that senators frequently were drawn from the ranks of the higher magistrates 
and the aediles). 
28 Lintott, supra, at 104-05. 
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over certain trials as judge; he could appoint a dictator (although the senate appears to have had 
some role in this appointment as well29).  After 81 B.C., consuls’ military role was 
deemphasized.  Others (often called proconsuls) were appointed to conduct military campaigns, 
and consuls stayed in Rome and discharged their civilian duties.  Consuls could veto each other’s 
actions but preferred to cooperate.30  To avoid conflict, consuls took turns holding the power to 
set the agenda, alternating by month.31 
 
b.  Praetors 
 
 Praetors were junior to consuls but nonetheless very powerful magistrates as well.  They 
also served single one-year terms.32  Originally, there was only one praetor; the number was 
increased to two around 242 B.C.; in 81 B.C. the number appears to have been increased to eight 
by Sulla.  By the end of the Republic, the number had been increased to sixteen.33  Praetors had 
most of the functions of the consul but not all—for example, they could not appoint dictators.  
They were junior to consuls so they had to step aside when consuls rejected their policies or 
actions.  Praetors served as governors of provinces, military adjuncts to consuls, or military 
commanders.  By the mid- to late Republic, all praetors had judicial functions. 34  They presided 
over civil and criminal trials, which gave them the ability to influence the outcomes, though 
verdicts would be rendered by juries.  Many such trials touched on questions of official 
misfeasance.35 
 
c.  Tribunes 
 
 Tribunes, unlike consuls and praetors, could only be plebeians, and were elected by 
plebeians.36  By the late Republic, ten tribunes served one-year terms.  Tribunes were understood 
to serve the plebeians’ interests and to defend them against the patricians.37  They presided over 
plebeian assemblies that could legislate and conduct certain political prosecutions, and had the 
important power to obstruct or veto proceedings in other bodies.  Tribunes could prevent the 
senate from convening, veto senate decrees, and stop other magistrates from performing their 
duties (“intercessio”) such as proposing legislation or taking actions against citizens such as 
arrests and prosecutions.  Their right to intercede was not absolute, but its contours were 
uncertain.38   
 
d.  Aediles 
 
 There were two pairs of aediles, plebeian and curule, who were elected in different ways, 
as discussed below.  However, the two types of aediles had similar functions.  They had 
                                                 
29 Abbott, supra at 240. 
30 For an overview of the transformation of the consuls’ military role over time, see Lintott, supra, at 114-15.  
31 Abbott, supra at 176. 
32 Abbott, supra, at 156. 
33 Lintott, supra, at 107-08. 
34 Abbott, supra, at 189-90. 
35 Lintott, supra, at 108-09. 
36 Abbott, supra, at 196. 
37 Abbott, supra, at 196. 
38 See Abbott, supra, at 198-99 (recognizing the lack of clarity over restrictions on intercessio). 
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responsibility for maintaining public buildings such as temples, streets and the water supply, and 
public order.  They staged the public games.  They also served as prosecutors in trials involving 
public law.39 
 
e.  Quaestors 
 
 Quaestors dealt with public finances.  Urban quaestors managed the public treasury, 
making payments and pursuing tax and other obligations.40  Consular quaestors managed army 
pay and finances.41  The number of quaestors increased from four in 421 B.C. to 40 in 45 B.C.;42 
they served one-year terms.  Quaestors were assigned to particular administrative posts, for 
example, for a province.43  Some were assistants to other magistrates.  Quaestors were assigned 
by the senate, presumably in consultation with the senior magistrates.44 
 
f.  Censors 
 
 Censors kept track of the Roman people and their property.  The two censors had terms 
that varied over the history of the Republic, but lasted around five years in the last two 
centuries.45  In addition to conducting the census—that is, counting up the people, ranking them 
by property holdings, and determining their tribal membership—censors passed judgment on 
them.  People who had showed cowardice in battle, or did not cultivate their lands, or committed 
some serious crime or moral offense, might be condemned by the censors, in which case they 
could not serve in the Senate or occupy important offices.  Censors also entered public contracts 
on behalf of Rome, both for public works and for taxation.46 
 
g.  Dictators 
 
 Unlike the other offices, the dictatorship was a temporary position (sometimes six 
months) that was created in emergencies.  The dictator was appointed (technically, nominated) 
by the consul (and/or the senate); sometimes he was popularly elected.47  The dictator was given 
military command for the purpose of addressing a military threat or suppressing a rebellion.  The 
authority of the dictator may have been absolute, or it may have been subject to some limitations 
(including the tribune’s veto).  He also may have had to share some de facto authority with his 
second-in-command, the separately appointed Master of the Horse.  But clearly he was the 
supreme leader while in office.  The dictatorship was not used after the Second Punic War ended 
in 201 B.C., until Sulla in 81 B.C. and Caesar beginning in 48 B.C.  During this period, the 
Senate used other devices to authorize consuls to take extraordinary action against threats.48 
 
                                                 
39 For an overview of aediles, see Lintott, supra, at 129-33. 
40 Abbott, supra, at 208.  
41 Lintott, supra, at 135. 
42 Abbott, supra at 207. 
43 Lintott, supra, at 135. 
44 Lintott, supra, at 136. 
45 Abbott, supra, at 115. 
46 Abbott, supra, at 117-20. 
47 Abbott, supra, at 110-11. 
48 Abbott, supra, at 111-13. 
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h.  Other Magistrates and Officials 
 
 There were numerous lower-ranked magistrates, most of them elected for one-year terms 
or approved on an ad hoc basis.  They performed various functions, for example, distributing 
lands, serving as judges in trials, cleaning roads, and managing the mint.49  Religious officials 
were also important.  The pontifex maximus headed the College of Pontiffs, the most important 
religious body in ancient Rome.  It had control over sacred spaces, public religious rituals, 
aspects of family law, and the calendar.50  The pontifex maximus was often a politician who was 
not necessarily pious (Julius Caesar, for example), and the powers of that office could be used 
for political purposes—for example, to adjust the calendar so as to extend a consul’s term of 
office.51  Other religious officials had the power to delay assemblies and other state functions for 
religious purposes. 
 
 Unlike in most modern systems, political officials often had religious functions.  Before 
calling assemblies, consuls were required to consult the augurs, who would examine the flights 
of birds, the entrails of sacrificed animals, and other signs of divine favor or displeasure.  Augurs 
could delay or nullify political actions if the omens were not auspicious.  Some evidence 
suggests that the political class manipulated these religious rites for political effect.  Cicero, for 
example, says that magistrates might adjourn an assembly citing unfavorable portents if they 
detected a disordered mood among the crowd or believed that the assembly would be politically 
“useless.”52 
 
 Provincial governors should also be mentioned.  These officials had extraordinary power, 
including military power.  They were not subject to restrictions the way that magistrates in Rome 
were, except they could be relieved of their positions and prosecuted for serious misconduct.  
One of Cicero’s earliest victories as a lawyer was over Gaius Verres, the former governor of 
Sicily, whom he prosecuted for corruption.  The earliest provincial governors were praetors; 
later, provincial governorships were given for one year to consuls and praetors at the end of their 
term. 
 
2.  Eligibility and Elections 
 
 A law of 180 B.C. prescribed certain qualifications for obtaining the senior offices.  One 
had to hold the quaestorship before becoming a praetor, and the praetorship before becoming a 
consul.  (This was known as the cursus honorum.53)  Offices could not be held consecutively but 
at two-year intervals.  There were also age requirements: 30 before becoming a quaestor, 36 
before becoming an aedile, 39 before becoming a praetor, and 42 before becoming a consul.  The 
tribuneship did not play a role in the cursus honorum because it was open only to plebeians.  The 
other offices were presumably deemed insufficiently important to serve as prerequisites to higher 
positions. 
                                                 
49 Lintott, supra, at 137-44. 
50 Lintott, supra, at 183-85, 189. 
51 See Leonhard Schmitz, Pontifex, in A DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITIES 939-42 (William Smith, 
ed., 1875). 
52 Cicero, Of the Laws, in TREATISE OF M.T. CICERO 473 (C.D. YOUNGE, ED. 1876) at 473. 
53 For an overview of the cursus honorum, see Abbott, supra, at 168-69. 
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 All of the offices I have discussed were filled by election except for the dictatorship, 
which was normally filled by consular (or senatorial) appointment.  Consuls, praetors, and 
censors were elected in the centuriate assembly.  Quaestors were elected in the tribal assembly.  
The plebeian aediles were elected in plebeian assemblies presided over by the tribune, while the 
curule aediles were elected in tribal assemblies presided over by a consul or praetor.54  The 
pontifex maximus was at some times elected by a popular assembly and at other times appointed 
by the college of pontiffs.55  Most of the offices were open to plebeians as well as patricians.  
Earlier in the Republic many offices were barred to plebeians, but these prohibitions were 
eliminated over time.56  Some of the offices (the tribune, at least one of the consuls, at least one 
of the censors) were open only to plebeians.57  There were two plebeian aediles; the two curule 
aediles could be either plebeian or patrician.58  However, consuls were proposed by the senate, 
and the senate normally (although not always) proposed consuls from the ranks of the patricians 
who dominated that body. 
 
 Recall that senators were not elected.  However, because senators were drawn from the 
ranks of former elected officeholders, and because they were selected by elected officials such as 
consuls and censors (also by two dictators, Sulla and Caesar), popular elections indirectly 
influenced the composition of the senate as well. 
 
 There was no formal property requirement to be a magistrate,59 but only wealthy people 
could have afforded to be a magistrate.  Magistrates did not draw a salary and some of them were 
expected to finance their public tasks out of their own pocket.  For example, aediles paid for the 
games.60  Other magistrates with access to the public treasure were expected to post security 
using their own funds.61  And election campaigns were expensive.  Candidates could obtain 
contributions or loans from others, but spent a great deal of their own money as well in order to 
secure election.62 
 
C.  Legislation (Herein, Assemblies) 
 
 Laws were enacted through the joint action of a magistrate and an assembly.  
Magistrates—consuls, praetors, aediles, tribunes, or dictators—summoned assemblies and 
proposed  bills.  Because assemblies did not follow a calendar, notices of meetings were posted 
in advance.  The assembles met in public spaces chosen by the magistrate or determined by 
tradition.  Because so many different officials could call assemblies, there was a danger of 
                                                 
54 For a comprehensive discussion of the eligibility and electoral requirements of magistrates, see Abbott, supra, at 
169-70, 171.  Assemblies are discussed, infra. 
55 Lintott, supra, at 184. 
56 Abbott, supra, at 167. 
57 Abbott, supra, at 196, 202. 
58 Abbott, supra, at 203-04. 
59 But see Claude Nicolet, THE WORLD OF THE CITIZEN IN REPUBLICAN ROME 318 (1989), who says it was, while 
acknowledging that conventional wisdom is otherwise.  It may be that he and other authors disagree about what was 
de facto and what was de jure. 
60 Abbott, supra, at 205-06. 
61 Nicolet, supra, at 4. 
62 See Abbott, supra, at 170 (noting that candidates for office often paid for public games and other public events in 
order to gain favor with the electorate and to gain notoriety). 
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conflict—that multiple assemblies would be called at the same time.  However, there was a rule 
that once an assembly began, another assembly could not be summoned; further, consuls could 
take over the assembly summoned by another magistrate, as could praetors unless the assembly 
was summoned by a consul.63  Magistrates asked members of the assembly for their opinions but 
the latter had no right to speak.64 
 
 Legislation required the summoning of two types of assemblies.  In the contio, speeches 
were made and debate occurred, but there was no voting.  These assemblies were relatively 
informal; nonvoters such as slaves and women attended.65  After the contio was dissolved, voting 
took place in the comitia.  This second type of assembly was regimented.66  Voters collected in 
an area organized into voting units (tribes or centuries) and marched forward to cast votes orally 
or (later) by using ballots.67 
 
 In the middle and late Republic, there were two major types of comitia: comitia 
centuriata (centuriate assemblies) and comitia tributa (tribal assemblies).68  Centuriate 
assemblies were organized into centuries, groups of men ranked by wealth.69  The organization 
had its origin in military structure: wealthier men who could purchase horses and armor belonged 
to the century with the highest rank (equites); slightly less wealthy men who could afford only 
armor held the next highest rank; and so on, down to men who could afford only light weaponry 
like slings.  The smaller number of wealthy people were dispersed among a larger number of 
centuries than poorer people were; thus, the equites (which were essentially officers) and the first 
class of pedites (the wealthiest of the five classes of enlisted men) composed a majority of the 
total number of centuries, and thus could determine voting outcomes if they were united, even 
though these people were less numerous than the membership in the other four classes of 
pedites.70 
 
 Tribal assemblies were based on tribal membership.  Every Roman citizen belonged to a 
tribe, which was essentially an arbitrary division of the Roman public based on ancient and 
probably fictive kinship groupings.71  People inherited their tribal status from their fathers, 
except for freedmen who were generally shunted into the overpopulated urban tribes.72  Voting 
took place by tribe.  If a majority of a tribe supported a bill or other measure, then that tribe was 
deemed a yea vote; the measure passed if a majority of tribes supported it.  The centuriate and 
tribal assemblies included men of both classes—patricians and plebeians—but there was also a 
separate type of tribal assembly known as the plebeian assembly that included only plebeians and 
was presided over by the tribune.73 
 
                                                 
63 Lintott, supra, at 43-44. 
64 Lintott, supra, at 41. 
65 Abbott, supra, at 252. 
66 Lintott, supra, at 42-43. 
67 LILY ROSS TAYLOR, ROMAN VOTING ASSEMBLIES 3-8, 111 (1966). 
68 A third type of assembly, the comitia curiata, was no longer used by the later Republic.  See Lintott, supra, at 49. 
69 Lintott, supra, at 55. 
70 Taylor, supra at 84-87. 
71 Abbott, supra, at 250, 260. 
72 Lintott, supra, at 50-51. 
73 See Taylor, supra at 3-8. 
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 Both types of assembly had general legislative powers in principle, but in practice the 
plebeian assembly enacted the bulk of legislation.  The centuriate assembly alone had the power 
to declare war and certain other powers related to military organization; it also elected consuls, 
praetors, and censors; and it conducted trials where the punishment was death.74  The tribal 
assembly voted on general legislation and elected other magistrates.  In some situations, the 
tribes voted simultaneously, but in legislative assemblies the tribes voted sequentially, with the 
results of each vote announced before the next.  The order of voting was determined by lot.75 
 
 The account so far might give a misleading impression that the system for enacting 
legislation was highly democratic, even biased in favor of the lower class.  As noted, most 
legislation was enacted by plebeian assembly, from which patricians were excluded; and the 
plebeian tribune, acting on behalf of the plebeians, could veto legislation in the centuriate and 
tribal assemblies where the patricians could vote. 
 
 However, several factors favored the patricians.  First, the senate, which was dominated 
by patricians, and the chief magistrates, who were usually patricians, set the legislative agenda.  
Second, plebeians wealthy and successful enough to become tribunes surely found that their 
interests had become aligned with those of the patricians, who sought to conserve Roman 
traditions and maintain the existing distribution of property.  Third, the assemblies were not 
entirely democratic in character.  In the centuriate assembly, people were assigned to centuries 
on the basis of wealth, and the wealthier centuries had priority in voting.76  In the tribal 
assembly, the urban tribes were overpopulated with the poor (including recently freed slaves).77  
Thus, the urban tribes could be outvoted by the less populated rural tribes which were dominated 
by landowners.  On the other hand, members of the urban tribes were more likely to be present, 
and sheer numbers and the ever-present threat of mob violence, must have made a difference.78  
Many patricians, notably Clodius (who actually transformed himself into a plebeian by 
engineering his “adoption” by a plebeian), came to power by promising to redistribute wealth to 
the poor, and used the mob effectively.79  Fourth, as a practical matter, only wealthy people 
could afford to be magistrates.80  Some positions—for example, judicial offices after 123 B.C.—
became the monopoly of the knightly class (equites).81  Fifth, the demos excluded women and 
slaves, and slaves were a large majority of the population.  It also excluded conquered peoples up 
until the Social War of 91-89 B.C., after which people living on the Italian peninsula (but by no 
means all conquered people) gradually were granted citizenship.82 
 
D.  Administration 
 
                                                 
74 Abbott, supra, at 257-58; Brennan, supra at 62. 
75 Taylor, supra at 70, 76. 
76 Taylor, supra at 59, 87 (quoting Livy: “Gradations were established so that no one would seem to be excluded 
from the vote and yet all the strength would rest with the leading men of the state.”). 
77 Taylor, supra, at 64-65. 
78 Taylor, supra, at 54. 
79 See Abbott, supra, at 113. 
80 See supra. 
81 Nicolet, supra, at 5. 
82 Nicolet, supra, at 23. 
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 Administrative functions were fulfilled by the magistrates.  The senate and the assemblies 
played no role.  The magistrates had almost complete administrative discretion outside of 
Rome—in the case of military commands and civilian leadership positions in provinces.83  
Checks were political and judicial.  Magistrates checked magistrates of equal and junior rank; 
tribunes could check all magistrates; and the senate exercised influence over magistrates as 
well.84  Magistrates could also be sued for violating Roman law. 
 
 Inside Rome, the story was different.  As we have seen, aediles, quaestors, and censors 
had responsibility for different aspects of municipal administration—aediles, for public works 
and games; quaestors for public finances; and censors for government contracts.  Numerous 
minor magistrates had other responsibilities—conducting executions, watching for fires, and so 
forth.85  They had to cooperate with each other, and with the tribunes, who could often obstruct 
their activities, and presumably with consuls and praetors as well.86 
 
 Although the magistrates were assisted by clerks, secretaries, and other personnel, the 
bureaucracy was tiny by modern standards.  The city limits of Republican Rome had a 
population in the hundreds of thousands, but did not have a police force or a prison system.87  
The huge bureaucracy associated with ancient Rome was not developed until the later Empire.88  
In the Republic, the weakness of the administrative system resulted in corruption and periods of 
mob rule.89  Cicero makes the interesting observation that tribuneships help diminish the 
volatility of mob rule by providing ordinary people with leaders who can discipline the mob and 
prevent it from acting irrationally.  For Cicero, the reduction of the dangers of mob rule justified 
the modest loss of control by patricians over policy outcomes.90 
 
E.  Criminal Judicial Process 
 
 For most of the history of the Republic, Romans did not have permanent courts; instead, 
tribunals were established on an ad hoc basis to investigate and try people suspected of particular 
crimes.91  Starting in the third century, the murky details about Roman criminal procedure 
become clearer.  Tribunes, aediles, and quaestors prosecuted defendants in assemblies; 
defendants mounted a defense; and the assembly voted to convict or acquit.92  In the second 
century and later, permanent courts were established where prosecutions were conducted by 
private citizens while magistrates presided as judges, and juries composed of equites and/or 
senators rendered verdicts.93 
 
                                                 
83 Lintott, supra, at 94-95, 104-06. 
84 Lintott, supra, at 99-102. 
85 Lintott, supra, 137-44. 
86 Lintott, supra, at 100-101. 
87 Nicolet, supra at 325. 
88 Abbott, supra, at 359-72. 
89 See Lintott, supra, at 213 (emphasizing the “violence and corruption which characterized politics” in Rome in the 
last decades of the republic). 
90 Cicero, Of the Republic, in THE TREATISES OF M.T. CICERO, supra, at 471. 
91 Lintott, supra, at 73-74. 
92 Lintott, supra at 153. 
93 Lintott, supra at 159; Nicolet, supra at 335. 
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F.  Rights and Constitutional Change 
 
 Roman constitutional law did not contain judicially enforceable individual rights in a 
modern sense.  Nonetheless, there were recognizable rights, which might be called constitutional 
or political rights.94  One such right, which can be found in the Twelve Tables, was that a Roman 
citizen cannot be executed without a trial.95  This right seems to have been taken very seriously.  
Roman citizens were rarely punished by execution at all.  Cicero, as consul, did order the 
execution of several Roman citizens without a trial, citing emergency.  But although his decision 
was supported at the time by the senate, he was later threatened with prosecution for this act and 
was driven into exile.96 
 
 Other rights included the right to participate in assemblies, or in general to political 
participation;97 the right to occupy the various magistracies; and perhaps various rights to 
judicial process.  Citizens threatened with coercion by magistrates had the right to appeal to 
popular assemblies or the tribunes (provocatio).98  After permanent courts were established, the 
right to provocatio became a right to judicial process.  This right is thought to be a precursor of 
habeas corpus.99 
 
II.  Analysis 
 
A.  The Literature on Roman Constitutionalism 
 
 In trying to explain the development of the Roman constitution, historians emphasize two 
themes: Romans’ fear of executive power, and the conflict between the elites and the masses.  
The fear of executive power explains the multitude of checks and balances in the Roman 
constitution.  The conflict between the elites and the masses explains why certain institutions 
were oriented toward one group or the other. 
 
 The Republic emerged from a rebellion against a monarchical system, and Romans 
sought to prevent a relapse.  It was for this reason that the Roman constitution established such a 
weak executive.  Two consuls shared power with each other, and with lesser magistrates who 
had independent sources of power.  The consuls could not make laws without popular approval; 
they could not punish people without securing the consent of a jury.  They could serve only one-
year terms, which prevented them from consolidating power and establishing permanent 
dictatorships.  They were subject to oversight by the senate, and interference from religious 
figures.  These urgent constitutional efforts to check executive power lend poignancy to the 
collapse of republican institutions and their replacement with an absolute monarchy in the first 
century B.C. 
 
                                                 
94 See Lintott, supra, at 199, 244 (arguing that Roman citizenship primarily “implied personal liberty,” which ceased 
as soon as a citizen left the borders of the Republic). 
95 Lintott, supra, at 149. 
96 Abbott, supra, at 103. 
97 Lintott, supra, at 202-03. 
98 Lintott, supra at 33, 98-99. 
99 See Nicolet, supra at 320-21, who emphasizes the significance of these legal protections for Roman self-identity. 
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 The other theme is the conflict between the elites and the masses—or to be more precise, 
the conflict between patricians and wealthy plebeians (often equites) who sought to maintain the 
status quo, and the ordinary plebeians and their occasional patrician leader who sought to 
redistribute wealth and power to the masses.  The first group came to be known as the optimates, 
the second as the populares.  In the early centuries of the Republic, the consuls and other 
magistrates were subject to the authority of the Senate, which was dominated by the elites.  And 
most offices were open only to patricians.  But the elites needed the support of ordinary people 
who supplied the bulk of manpower for military adventures and who were otherwise a potential 
source of instability.  To secure their support, the patricians yielded more and more rights to the 
plebeians over the centuries.  By the late Republic, certain offices were reserved for plebeians—
such as the tribuneship—while most other offices were open to members of both classes.  The 
plebeian assembly could even make law binding on the entire population. 
 
 That class conflict was central to Roman politics is the settled wisdom among 
historians.100  The ancient sources suggest a long-term trend in favor of the people.  However, 
how much power the patricians actually yielded to the lower class over time is the subject of 
considerable dispute.  On the one hand, patron-client relationships persisted throughout the entire 
period: if ordinary people depended on the nobles for subsidies, contacts, advice, and other 
benefits, they might not have been able to exercise much political independence.101  It took a vast 
amount of wealth to conduct election campaigns (which frequently involved bribery) and hold 
offices.  It was not just that magistrates were unpaid; they also were expected to use their own 
funds for the public good.  A small number of noble families dominated the governing class for 
centuries; families maintained their political power by entering alliances with each other, often 
ratified through the marriage of their children.  These families also dominated the religious cults, 
which had a great deal of influence over political life.102  Plebeians wealthy enough to win office 
often had the conservative outlook of the patricians.103  Cicero frequently gives the impression 
that the tribuneship and other institutions that favor the plebeians were granted to them in 
response to popular pressure but did not actually matter.  The public was happy with the 
constitutional forms of political power, which could cause annoyance but not affect political 
outcomes in a substantial way.104 
 
 On the other hand, the plebeians had the significant advantage of numbers.  And, indeed, 
the poorest of the plebeians exercised disproportionate influence through the threat of street 
violence: only a fraction of Roman citizens actually lived in Rome and those citizens were 
among the very poorest.105  Patricians needed the support of plebeians because they supplied the 
soldiers so important for Rome’s defense and imperial glory.  Many plebeians did attain high 
office—and both plebeian and patrician politicians rose to power by appealing to plebeian 
interests.  Elections were meaningful; assemblies mattered.  Aside from the changes in the 
Roman constitution that progressively favored the plebeians, significant substantive laws were 
                                                 
100 See G.E.M. DE STE. CROIX, THE CLASS STRUGGLE IN THE ANCIENT GREEK WORLD: FROM THE ARCHAIC AGE TO 
THE ARAB CONQUESTS (1998). 
101 See MARTIN GILBERT, HISTORY OF ROME 70-71 (1978). 
102 Gilbert, supra, at 71. 
103 The claim that the Roman Republic was essentially oligarchic seems to be the standard view; see, e.g., S.E. 
FINER, 1 THE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT 387 (1997).  For a more recent version, see Nicolet, supra. 
104 See, e.g., Cicero, Of the Republic, supra, at 341-42; Cicero, Of the Laws, supra, at 468-77. 
105 Finer, supra, at 426-27. 
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enacted that benefited plebeians—from land reform to the distribution of free food.  Patron-client 
relationships, bribery, and private financing of public goods can also be reinterpreted as 
reflections of plebeian power.  Why would patrician politicians risk bankruptcy to pay off 
plebeians if they had no political power?106  The fact that plebeians secured substantive laws that 
benefited them, and that their efforts to secure these laws usually respected constitutional forms, 
suggests that the Roman political system was not a pure oligarchy.  One might call it democratic 
republic that heavily favored an aristocracy or an oligarchy with significant democratic elements. 
 
 The two themes—fear of executive power and the conflict between the elites and the 
masses—are closely linked in Roman history.  Roman elites feared popular demagogues from 
their own class—individuals who could amass power by promising to redistribute wealth from 
the nobles to the plebeians and hence securing their support in the assemblies.  It seems clear that 
this fear lay behind many of the constitutional norms.  If those norms were respected, it would be 
impossible even for a successful general or charismatic demagogue to establish a personal 
dictatorship.  He could not be consul for more than one year; he would have to share power with 
others; as a member of the senate, he had just one vote; and so forth.  The problem turned out to 
be that constitutional traditions were not powerful enough to prevent this from happening.  
People could obtain power through extra-constitutional means—for example, by relying on 
soldiers and other supporters to threaten violence.  This is what eventually happened, starting 
with Sulla in 82 and culminating with Caesar.  But only after more than 400 years of 
extraordinary political achievement. 
 
B.  A Political Economy Perspective 
 
1.  The Agency Model 
 
 Agencies models are extremely abstract, and can be applied to any case where one person 
(the agent) acts in a way that benefits another person (the principal).  Typically, scholars study 
cases where the principal has some way to control the agent, so then the analysis focuses on 
methods the principal can use to control the agent at least cost, that is, minimize agency costs.  In 
the simplest models, there is a single agent and a single principal; but the models have been 
extended to cases where there are multiple agents and multiple principles. 
 
 Political economy models typically simplify by treating the “government” as a single 
agent and the “people” as a single principle, but of course these are abstractions, and these 
assumptions are frequently relaxed.  A government consists of multiple offices and institutions, 
and these can be treated as separate agents; the principal might sometimes be the people or a 
subset of the people or an institution like a political party or a branch of government. 
 
 In the case of Rome, the initial impulse is to treat the Roman “government” as the agent, 
and the Roman “people” as the principal.  The people control the government through the 
constitution which is a set of self-enforcing norms that dictate what the government can do.107  I 
                                                 
106 For a defense of the democratic element in the Roman constitution, see FERGUS MILLAR, THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 
AND THE AUGUSTAN REVOLUTION chs. 4-5 (2002). 
107 On self-enforcing constitutions, see Barry R. Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to 
Democratic Stability in America’s First Century (unpub. m.s., 2003). 
18 
 
will generally rely on this simplification in my discussion of the Roman constitution, but I must 
start by noting the many ways in which it is inaccurate. 
 
 The question of who is the principal in the Roman Republic turns out to be more difficult 
than it first appears.  The vast majority of people living in Rome and its territories were slaves, 
women, and conquered people who had not been given citizenship.  It might be more accurate to 
say that the government was the agent of Roman citizens.  But even this claim might not be 
sustainable.  Most of the people were poorly educated, and impoverished; it might be doubted 
whether they could wield much control over the sophisticated and vastly wealthy elites, many of 
whom exerted power through patronage and private guards and gangs.  On the other hand, Rome 
had a complex class structure.  Patricians formed the highest class but, as so often happens with 
the upper classes, they were reluctant to engage in commercial activity, and so they lost 
influence to merchants and farmers who amassed wealth.  These people entered the class of 
equites, who had certain political privileges.  “New men” like Cicero could obtain semi-
aristocratic status by becoming consuls.  Slaves were at the very bottom, but many managed to 
buy themselves out of slavery or were granted freedom by their masters.  Freedmen had lower 
status than the free born, but some became immensely wealthy and influential nonetheless.  
People from the provinces form yet another group; they had few rights at home, when ruled by 
provincial governors, but brought a different perspective and often acquired citizenship when 
they came to Rome.  For a class system, ordinary notions of the principal’s “ideal point” might 
be inappropriate. 
 
 If, as is often claimed, Rome was an oligarchy,108 the proper assumption is that the 
government served as an agent for the upper class or some segment of it—the patricians and 
wealthy equites, the optimates, or perhaps a few great families.  That is the impression one gets, 
for example, from Cicero, who sometimes writes as though ordinary people are a hostile force 
that must be propitiated by the government for the sake of the nobility; at other times, however, 
he treats the people as the principal albeit one that does not, and should not, have any control 
over the agent, which is wiser than they are.109  On the oligarchic view, the principal consists of 
the relevant oligarchy; the government maximizes the utility of its members but also must pay 
other members of society whatever the minimum is necessary to prevent them from engaging in 
civil war or causing a domestic disturbance.110 
 
 The Romans themselves appeared to have yet another view of the principal: the Senate 
and Populus of Rome—the Latin acronym is SPQR.111  This name implies two principals—the 
Senate and the people.  These two principals are separate yet share sovereignty; compare “we the 
people” in the United States and the Athenian demos, which imply a single principal.  One 
suspects that “Senate” stands in for the upper class—the patrician and wealthy plebeian families 
that dominated Rome.  Imagine, then, that two principals form a joint venture and expect the the 
                                                 
108 See supra note __. 
109 See generally, Cicero, Of the Republic, supra. 
110 Compare, for example, ALBERTO ALESINA & ENRICO SPOLAORE, THE SIZE OF NATIONS (2003), who assume that 
a dictator maximizes the utility of a constituency while subject to an “insurrection constraint”—he must ensure that 
others are above some minimum level of welfare. 
111 “SPQR” can be seen on public infrastructure throughout the modern city of Rome. 
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governmental agents to serve their joint interests.  This again suggests a state with a form of 
government that lies somewhere between oligarchy and democracy. 
 
 Similar complications arise when we turn our attention to the agent.  It is at best a rough 
approximation to say that Rome had a “government.”  It lacked the enormous, permanent, 
hierarchical bureaucracy that is the essential character of government in modern states.  (It did, 
however, have a large army, albeit sometimes supplemented by forces paid out of the personal 
funds of individuals like Crassus during the slave revolt of 71 B.C., and toward the end of the 
Republic, mainly loyal to its commanders, who rewarded soldiers with booty.)  As we have seen, 
the government comprised officials who were not require to cooperate with each other and were 
not subject to the control of a single person or institution.  Magistrates could not rely on a police 
force to keep order, and often resorted to private guards, private gangs, and even private armies.  
Still, it seems fair to say that over time the Roman government acted in a largely consistent and 
coherent way, thanks in large part to the senate and perhaps the small size of the elite. 
 
 The Roman government, like governments at all times and places, did two things: it 
supplied public goods and it redistributed wealth.  The public goods included security against 
external enemies; the rewards of conquest, including loot, tribute, and taxation; suppression of 
rebellion; the maintenance of public order; the construction and maintenance of roads, sewer 
systems, viaducts, and other infrastructure; adjudication of private disputes; and enforcement of 
property and contract rights.  This type of public-good provision fits easily into the principal-
agent model.  The various cleavages among the population manifested themselves mainly in 
distributional conflict.  Everyone agreed on the need for security; they disagreed about who 
should pay for it.  Everyone welcomed conquest, but disagreed about how the spoils should be 
distributed.  These distributional conflicts led to constitutional controversies because when 
ordinary people did not get what they regarded as their fair share, they sought more 
representation in government or stronger roles for their representatives.  Nonetheless, everyone 
had an interest in a government that would maximize the social surplus. 
 
 My focus, however, will be agency costs.  The political economy literature identifies a 
number of ways of reducing agency costs.  I will focus on (1) methods for selecting government 
officials; (2) division of powers among offices and institutions; and (3) rewarding and 
sanctioning government officials. 
 
2.  Selection of Government Officials 
 
 Government agents such as magistrates may make decisions that are contrary to the 
public interest because they lack competence or because they have preferences that deviate from 
those of the principal.  The Roman constitution addressed this problem in three ways: 
qualification rules for office; elections; and screening by the censors. 
 
 The major qualification rules were the age restrictions and the cursus honorum.  These 
rules ensured that young, inexperienced people could not hold high office, and thus reduced the 
risk that an incompetent person might be elected.  The cursus honorum ensured that people with 
mainstream preferences became consul, for people with idiosyncratic preferences were unlikely 
to win multiple elections. 
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 Likewise, elections are a straightforward method for aggregating information and 
preferences.  Suppose that the competence and political preferences of candidates are private 
information, but individuals can make inferences about this information on the basis of their 
prior behavior.  Elections are efficient mechanisms for aggregating this information as long as 
people vote independently.  One feature of Roman elections that may have worked against this 
function, however, was that voting was public and often sequential rather than simultaneous: one 
tribe or century votes first; its vote is publicly recorded as a yea or nay for a particular candidate; 
then another tribe or century votes.  The later voters might rationally herd;112 indeed, herding 
was encouraged by the perverse superstition in tribal assemblies that the first tribe, which was 
selected by lot, reflected the will of the gods, and so subsequent tribes should follow it.113  In 
later years, the secret ballot was introduced, so that voters could not be intimidated by the 
powerful; this may also have dampened herd behavior. 
 
 Qualification rules and elections are in tension.  If qualification rules restrict who can be 
elected, the people do not have unfettered choice.  From time to time, voters suspended 
qualification rules so that exceptionally talented individuals could be appointed at an early age or 
without previously occupying an office in the cursus honorum.  However, usually the 
qualification rules were respected.  Senators were indirectly elected.  Although appointed by 
consuls or censors, they were not eligible for appointment unless they had served as a magistrate 
in the past, which means that they had won an election.  This is one way of reconciling the 
tension between popular sovereignty and the republican principle that only virtuous people 
should hold office.  In the United States, this tension was resolved in another way: Americans 
could not vote directly for senators or the president—state legislatures and the electoral college 
served as mediating institutions. 
 
 Fears that elections would result in bad choices also may have accounted for the voting 
structure.  Both the centuriate and tribal assemblies were biased in favor of the wealthy.  One 
might believe that the wealthy, educated class selects magistrates more wisely than the illiterate 
masses do.  On the other hand, the elites are not likely to choose magistrates who serve the 
interests of the masses, and they might not understand those interests in any event.  And not all 
common people were illiterate; many (including slaves) were highly educated.  The Roman 
voting system was a compromise, weighted in favor of the wealthy but permitting the masses to 
have influence when the wealthy were divided. 
 
 The American constitution has many fewer eligibility requirements—the most notable 
one is the rule that the president must be a natural born citizen and at least the age of 35.  One 
could imagine a cursus honorum, one requiring, for example, that a person serve as governor (or 
senator) before becoming president, and member of the House (or mayor or alderman) before 
becoming governor or senator.  Such a rule would reduce the risk that unqualified people reach 
high office, but it would also limit democratic choice in a way that surely would be considered 
unacceptable. 
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 The difference can be attributed to the more fluid political environment that existed in 
ancient times.  Then, it was possible for a talented young man from a prominent family to 
achieve military success early in his career, and amass wealth and influence while still in his 
twenties (or even teens).  Such a person might harbor dictatorial ambitions and possess the 
means to achieve them, while lacking the temperament and experience for republican politics.  
By contrast, wealth and military glory are not straightforward paths to the presidency in the 
United States.  Unlike in ancient Rome, no one is wealthy enough to finance whole armies (as 
Crassus, Pompey, and Caesar could); and military glory is rare and usually comes only to elderly 
generals who have gradually moved up the ranks over the course of a long career.  As a result, 
American politics are dominated by civilian career politicians who obtain prominence through 
compromise and consensus-building.  Eligibility rules that emphasize age and experience are 
unnecessary. 
 
3.  Division and Limitation of Powers 
 
 Governance can be divided along two dimensions: policy domain (war, public order, 
games, and so forth) and type of power (legislative, executive, judicial).  The U.S. founders 
divided the government by power—Congress has the legislative power, the president has 
executive power, and the judiciary has the judicial power—while also assigning some 
duplicative powers and imposing some restrictions on policy domain.  The Roman constitution, 
by contrast, is divided (roughly) by policy domain.  Consuls and praetors had authority over war 
and public security; quaestors over finances; censors over the census; aediles over public 
infrastructure and games; and so forth.  Again, there was some overlap.  But the Roman 
constitution did not make a fetish of separation of powers.  Most of the magistrates had 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers: they made policy within broad legal constraints, 
executed it, and interpreted the law. 
 
 The Roman system had a number of advantages.114  First, the structure of the 
magistracies limited the amount of mischief that a single officeholder could do.  If an 
incompetent or preference-outlier is elected to an office, he can produce problems only within 
his jurisdiction.  Having no authority over games, an incompetent praetor cannot put on bad 
games.  If some fraction of elected magistrates are incompetent, then the effect of distributing 
power over multiple magistrates is to reduce the variance of policy outcomes.  By contrast, a 
single executive office produces consistently good outcomes when a competent person holds the 
office and consistently bad outcomes when an incompetent person holds the office. 
 
 Second, the Roman system established relatively clear lines of authority, in this way 
easing the burden on the public to monitor and sanction officeholders.  Because the aedile is 
responsible for games, the public can evaluate an aedile on the basis of the success of the games.  
As a result, the public learns about the abilities of the aedile, and can reward him with future 
offices, or sanction him by denying him future offices.  A consul responsible for defense of the 
city will be judged on the basis of whether the defense fails or succeeds.  By contrast, in the 
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American system lines of responsibility are not always so clear.115  When crime increases, it is 
hard to know whether to blame the executive for inadequate enforcement, the legislature for 
insufficiently tough laws, or the judiciary for excessive protection of procedural rights.  Thus, in 
the Roman system, it was easier for the people to evaluate, and hence to reward and punish, 
officeholders on the basis of their public acts.116 
 
 Third, the Roman system nonetheless did provide for checks that ensured that projects 
went ahead only if they had sufficient political support.  If a consul is tempted to enact a law that 
favors the elites, then a tribune or the other consul can veto it, and indeed a popular assembly can 
refuse to approve it.  As a result, an implicit supermajoritarian rule holds: policies will be 
implemented only if officeholders representing a broad array of interests favors it.  
Supermajoritarian rules can be justified on the ground that they prevent redistributive politics 
while permitting government to produce public goods when decision costs are low.117  It is 
impossible to know whether supermajoritarian rules served this purpose in Rome or merely 
entrenched the status quo—a question to which I will return.  For now, the interesting 
comparison is between the Roman and American systems of checking.  In the American system, 
a branch of government cannot check another branch when that branch acts solely within its 
domain.  So, for example, the judiciary does not try to check prosecutorial discretion.  In the 
Roman system, such checking is possible.  If the purpose of checks and balances is to ensure that 
a supermajoritarian element exists in policymaking, then the American system is hard to justify.  
There is no particular reason to limit checking to cases where the three different types of powers 
must come into play in order for political outcomes to be achieved. 
 
 While Madison and Montesquieu complained that the failure to separate legislative, 
executive, and judicial power results in “tyranny,” the usual complaint about the Roman system 
is that the division of powers caused gridlock.118  Again, let us compare the American and the 
Roman system.  Simplifying greatly, the American president can respond to an emergency by 
either drawing on existing statutory authority or obtaining a single authorization from Congress, 
and then taking whatever actions seem necessary, subject only to a judicial check against 
arbitrary arrests and similar police actions.  A Roman consul could respond to an emergency 
without senate authorization (though senate authorization would be prudent), and could, in 
principle, establish policy and use coercion in order to achieve it.  Yet at all times, he would need 
to contend with objections from the other consul and the ten tribunes, and eventually he would 
be required to grant people trials.  It seems that, on the whole, the American executive has more 
freedom of action than the Roman consul did.  Rules restricting consuls to one-year terms, and 
limiting the frequency with which an individual could hold consulships and other offices, further 
weakened the executive in the Republic by preventing talented individuals from accumulating 
political power. 
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 Brennan and Hamlin note that American-style separation of powers reproduces at the 
political level the dual monopoly problem analyzed in the industrial organization literature.119  
Suppose the government produces a public good but charges a “price” in the form of taxes.  A 
single government official would set a monopoly price; but if two government officials must 
agree to the project, then the first (akin to a supplier) will charge a monopoly price to the second 
(akin to a distributor) who will then treat the first official’s consent as, in effect, a costly input, 
and pass the cost along to the taxpayer plus an additional markup reflecting the second official’s 
monopoly power.  Because of the principle of collegiality in the Roman constitution, this 
problem might seem even more significant than in the American constitution.  A consul who 
seeks to implement a project must bribe the other consul not to veto it.  However, there are two 
competing factors.  First, the consuls were individuals and could bargain very easily with each 
other—much more easily than the president can bargain with Congress, which consists of two 
houses, each with a multitude of members.  Second, the consuls typically came from the same 
class, and often were bound by family and clan alliances.  From the standpoint of the 
Brennan/Hamlin model, separation of powers in Rome appears less damaging than it is in the 
United States, at least until the last century of Rome’s existence.  Gridlock and the other 
pathologies of separation of powers could be avoided through bargaining in a small, homogenous 
political class. 
 
 The Roman constitution also addressed the weakness of executive power in more direct 
ways.  Magistrates such as consuls, proconsuls, and praetors enjoyed broadest powers when 
outside Rome, while on campaigns or when administering provinces.  In these situations, there 
were relatively fewer concerns that the magistrates would abuse their powers because they had 
less authority over Romans (aside from soldiers, travelers, and administrators).  For that reason, 
they could be subject to fewer limits. 
 
 In addition, magistrates could not be everywhere at once, and a magistrate could not veto 
the action of another magistrate unless in his presence.  The constraints of time and space thus 
could facilitate governance, albeit only as a result of contingency.  Magistrates in the same 
college also divided up responsibilities temporally (consuls took turns with authority on a 
monthly basis) and by domain, in this way avoiding direct conflict but possibly interfering with 
continuity of governance. 
 
 Further, the senate played an important role in coordinating the magistrates.  However, 
the senate was not an elected body; as a result, senators, who surely reflected the interests of the 
wealthy, had an impact on policy outcomes through their influence on the assignment of roles to 
magistrates and their resolution of disputes between them. 
 
 Finally, the Roman constitution had a safety valve in the office of the dictator.  The 
dictator did not have to coordinate with other magistrates; unlike the consul, the dictator did not 
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have to contend with another person simultaneously holding the same office.  Of course, such 
unbridled authority could be abused.  The further solution to this problem was that dictators 
could hold office for only six months.  Abuse was therefore time-limited.  And because the 
dictator was selected by the consuls who were broadly responsible for the security of the 
Republic, the dictator would likely be a person who was experienced and enjoyed a fair amount 
of trust.  However, even these protections may not have been enough.  From the second century 
B.C. through Sulla, the political class avoided reliance on dictators and instead the senate 
authorized a consul to take extraordinary actions during times of emergency.  As an elected 
official, the consul may have had more trust among the public. 
 
4.  Term Limits 
 
 The magistrates suffered under severe term limits of, in most cases, one year.  They could 
not run for reelection, and there seemed to have been a presumption, on occasion disregarded, 
that a Roman could hold an office he had held before only after a long interval.  In the United 
States, most officeholders have longer terms—two or more years.  In the national government, 
only the president faces a term limit. 
 
 Scholars are generally critical of term limits because they prevent competent 
officeholders from staying in office and reduce the incentive of individuals to run for office in 
the first place.120  In Rome, term limits may have been attractive for several reasons.  First, term 
limits prevented consuls from acquiring monarchical powers.  They had to share power over 
time, which meant that dictatorial acts undertaken their term of office could be reversed.  
Second, term limits also prevented officeholders from accumulating political capital, which 
would enable them to acquire excessive power.  A person who held office for only one year 
would be quickly forgotten. 
 
 The Roman system may have worked well enough for a period of time, but its chief flaw 
became apparent in the last century.  Because no civilian politician could amass much power 
through office, and perhaps because none had strong incentives to discharge their official duties 
competently, none could stand up to the military leaders who earned glory at battle and could 
offer loot to soldiers and civilians who supported them.  Military posts was not term-limited; and 
so successful generals could earn a popular following over a long period of time.  These military 
leaders included Marius, Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar, and they were the dominant figures during 
the last century of the Republic’s existence.  By contrast, most of the consuls of that era—aside 
from these figures and Cicero—were undistinguished. 
 
5.  Rewarding and Sanctioning Government Officials 
 
 Principals cannot reward and sanction agents unless they can observe either the agent’s 
performance or the outcome (payoff) of the agent’s performance.  Roman constitutional norms 
provided plenty of opportunities for such observation.  Senatorial debates, assembly meetings, 
and judicial proceedings were all public and seem to have been attended by a great many people.  
However, physical structure put limits on the extent of public monitoring.  Rome had a 
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population in the hundreds of thousands but in certain public spaces, only tens of thousands of 
people could have been present.121 
 
 The division of powers by policy domain also lent itself to public monitoring.  If the 
games were unsatisfactory, then everyone knew to blame the aedile with the responsibility for 
them.  If a military campaign ended in failure, then the relevant consul or praetor could be held 
accountable.  In addition, intense competition for political offices gave candidates with access to 
private information incentives to disclose such information when it harmed opponents.  Finally, 
the requirement that citizens be out of office for two years between magistracies ensured that the 
medium-term consequences of their actions could be observed before they were elected to a new 
office. 
 
 But what were the rewards and sanctions, concretely?  Roman politicians sought honor 
and wealth.  Many politicians inherited a distinguished family name that imposed burdens and 
conferred opportunities.  A family name is a form of human capital that one inherits rather than 
earns.  Because Romans gave some deference to people from old families, a distinguished family 
name provided its bearer with political opportunities but also subjected him to a kind of bond.  If 
he ended up a political failure, he disgraced his ancestors and deprived his descendants of the 
opportunities that he enjoyed.  Maybe, these psychological factors gave Roman politicians longer 
time-horizons than those of American politicians. 
 
 To obtain honor, a Roman politician must contribute to the glory and prosperity of Rome.  
If he is an aedile, he must stage impressive games.  If he is a consul, he must win military 
victories or keep the peace.  Cicero won honor by suppressing the Catalina conspiracy.  The 
highest honor was the triumph, a spectacular victory parade that enhanced the leader’s prestige 
among the public, which one could earn only by being a military leader, and most (but not all) 
military leaders were consuls (or praetors).  But one could become a consul or praetor only if one 
first was a quaestor.  Thus, the Roman system harnessed the thirst for military victory to more 
mundane civic needs such as the management of public finances. 
 
 Money also played an important role in Roman politics.  Officeholders were not paid, and 
were often expected to finance projects out of their own wealth.  Many ambitious politicians 
resorted to borrowing; if they did not repay their debts, they could be ruined.  At the same time, 
offices presented opportunities for gain.  A consul who was given command of an army received 
a large share of the booty if he gained victory, and provincial governorships—the reward to 
consuls after their term of office expired—tendered semi-legal opportunities for their occupants 
to enrich themselves at the expense of the governed.  In these ways, high offices offered 
pecuniary awards as well as honors, aligning politician’s incentives to do well with the self-
interest of the Roman people. 
 
 But only partially.  A magistrate who borrowed in order to win an election, and could 
only repay those debts by winning a military victory, had strong incentives to win a military 
victory.  But he might also plan and execute his military campaign in a way that yields the 
highest gain for himself rather than for Rome—for example, targeting a weak but wealthy enemy 
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rather than a powerful enemy that posed more of a threat.  Similarly, governors who milked the 
provinces for their own benefit set the stage for civil strife in the future. 
 
 The Romans were aware of these problems.  Consuls sought triumphs—the highest 
political honor—by winning battles, and this might cause the distortion in incentives noted 
above,122 but the senate had the authority to confer or deny them, and it could have used that 
authority to dissuade consuls from pursuing military victories of no value for the Roman 
Republic.  Magistrates and governors who abused their office could be prosecuted after the term 
of office expired.123  However, many prosecutions were thought to be politically motivated, the 
result of private feuds.  Thus, whether the availability of prosecution reduced rather than 
increased agency costs depends on how impartial the judicial system was.  If jurors could be 
persuaded to convict only when the magistrate abused the office, then prosecution would have 
improved magistrates’ incentives.  But if jurors could be easily bribed, or swayed by temporary 
political passions, then magistrates would have regarded the prospect of trial as a cost of doing 
business, but would have not have changed their behavior in response to it. 
 
 Censors could remove senators who committed crimes, became bankrupt, or violated 
serious moral norms.  In the U.S. system, the Senate (and the House) have the responsibility for 
policing their members.  Both institutions resolve one set of agency problems but create new 
ones.  The prospect of removal might cause agents to act in the public interest, but the people 
with the power to remove do not necessarily want them to act in the public interest.  Elections of 
censors helped mitigate the latter problem but would not have been sufficient.  Perhaps for this 
reason, the Romans seem to have been nervous about the powers of the censors, and their terms, 
although nominally five years, were shortened from time to time. 
 
 The short term of office might also be a way of limiting the damage that an incompetent 
official could do.  But it also limited the good that a competent official could do.  In addition, 
office attracts talented people to the extent that they can obtain rents; the shorter the office, the 
fewer the rents, and thus the smaller the incentive for entering political life. 
 
 Compared to the American system, Roman politicians had a great deal more at stake in 
politics.  A successful political career resulted in fame, riches, and respect.  A failed political 
career could result in death (at the hands of mobs and even political competitors) or exile (after a 
politically motivated prosecution), and certainly bankruptcy and disgrace.  The high stakes must 
have given Roman politicians very strong incentives to perform well.  However, they also had 
perverse consequences.  Because one could be prosecuted only after leaving office, magistrates 
had incentives to forestall such prosecutions by taking legal action against their enemies or (in 
the case of Caesar) refusing to leave office or (in the case of Catalina) fomenting rebellion.  
These perverse incentives were held in check for most of the Republic’s history, but they 
contributed to its collapse. 
 
 In the United States, politics is not a life and death struggle.  The low stakes ensure that 
power is given up voluntarily and transfers of power are peaceful.  Elected officials have weaker 
incentives to rig the game in the incumbent’s favor.  If incentives to perform well are less strong, 
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by the same token the incentives to challenge the constitutional system are weaker, and so 
political instability is rarer. 
 
6.  The Role of the Senate 
 
 The system of independent magistrates creates a problem of coordination.  If there are 
multiple aediles, which aedile is responsible for the games?  If there are two consuls, which one 
will take command in the east and which will take command in the west?  These are problems of 
coordination which are characteristic of unbundled executives.124  The senate helped coordinate 
magistrates.  Sometimes, the senate presided while magistrates drew lots.  At other times, the 
senate directly appointed magistrates to undertake particular tasks.  By issuing decrees that 
reflected general policies, the senate also provided a means for magistrates to coordinate their 
actions. 
 
 The senate also played an important role in maintaining the continuity of government.  
Because most magistrates had one-year terms, they might have taken a short-term view toward 
Rome’s interests.125  The influence of the senate assured people that policies adopted by 
magistrates extended for greater than one year.  For example, creditors want assurance that debts 
undertaken in one year will be repaid in a later year.  By endorsing the actions of magistrates in 
one period, the senate led people to expect that those actions would not be repudiated by 
subsequent magistrates. 
 
 For the senate to serve these functions, it would need to be able to control the magistrates.  
It had several methods for doing this.  First, the senate bestowed honors on magistrates.  For 
example, the senate determined whether a military leader received a triumph.  Second, the senate 
initiated criminal proceedings against magistrates who abused their office.  Third, the senate had 
control over public finances, and could penalize magistrates by refusing to fund them.  Fourth, 
senators were rich and influential, and magistrates would have wanted to maintain good 
relationships with them for personal as well as political reasons.  Fifth, the senate had power to 
influence the allocation of tasks among magistrates, so magistrates who acted badly could be 
deprived of appealing (and often lucrative) posts and projects.126  To be sure, it is possible that 
magistrates could ignore these assignments.  But the magistrates faced a coordination game 
where they could end up with very low payoffs if they engaged in the same tasks as other 
magistrates.  Tradition gave the senate the role of coordinator (focal point), and it would have 
been difficult for magistrates to break out of this equilibrium. 
 
 In performing these functions, the senate diluted the control of the people over the 
magistrate through elections and popular approval of legislation.  We might imagine a model, 
then, in which the people are the principal, and the principal controls the agents (the magistrates) 
both directly and through the senate.  Modern business corporations have a roughly analogous 
structure.  Shareholders control corporate policy both directly (certain actions like mergers must 
be approved by shareholders) and through an independent institution, the board of directors.  
Both the Roman senate and the board of directors enjoy a certain level of independence from the 
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ultimate stakeholders.  Senators are selected by censors; directors are selected by CEOs subject 
to a rubber stamp by shareholders.  These forms of indirect representation raise agency costs.  
Censors do not necessarily act in the interest of the people (though they are elected themselves), 
and directors do not necessarily act in the interest of shareholders.  The de facto and de jure 
qualifications for the senate also ensured that it was not a representative body.  On the other 
hand, because senators were drawn from ex-magistrates, they were politicians who had in the 
past proven that they were acceptable to the people in elections. 
 
 Another feature of the senate was that it was a large body—generally in the neighborhood 
of 300 people—and hence subject to all the problems of collective decisionmaking.  Senators 
had an incentive to free-ride on information-gathering and deliberation, and were vulnerable to 
agenda-setting by the magistrates, who could introduce bills or proposals and make take-it-or-
leave-it offers.  These factors suggest a weak and passive body.  However, some historians argue 
that the senate was controlled by a core group of old and powerful families.127  If that was the 
case, then the senate served a more effective coordinating and disciplinary role, but was less 
representative of the interests of the people. 
 
 The U.S. Senate is often called a millionaire’s club, but it hardly resembles the Roman 
Senate at all.  It does not serve the interests of the elites in any clear sense; it is certainly not 
understood to have that function, as the Senate in Rome was.  The United States has a single 
principal (“we the people”) rather than a dual principal (SPQR).  This is surely the result of the 
fact that the United States does not have clearly demarcated classes; as a result, it would make 
little sense to give different government institutions the responsibility of advancing the interests 
of one class or the other. 
 
7.  Judicial Process 
 
 From a modern perspective, it is strange that a magistrate, who has executive and 
legislative power, could also serve as a judge.  As judge, the magistrate would have strong 
incentives to favor political allies and harm political adversaries rather than respect the rule of 
law. 
 
 Although the details of judicial procedure in public law cases are murky, there appear to 
have been a number of checks on this type of behavior.  It appears that magistrates never or 
rarely initiated the cases in which they served as judges.  Cases were initiated by the senate and 
the popular assemblies, or by different magistrates.  The jury was an important check as well.  
Not only would acquittal protect the defendant; it would also give rise to an inference that the 
magistrate had wasted public resources pursuing a politically vindictive case.  It also does not 
appear that Roman judges had as much power as modern judges do.  The law was mostly 
customary and the jury had a great deal of discretion to decide cases as it saw fit.  However, 
because jurors were selected from the upper class, the system as a whole worked in favor of the 
wealthier and better connected. 
 
8.  Popular Sovereignty 
 
                                                 
127 See, e.g., Gilbert, supra, at 146-49. 
29 
 
 Rome had a mixed system of representative and direct democracy.  People voted for 
magistrates, who conducted the government’s business; but they also voted on bills proposed by 
the magistrates.  The system is in many ways appealing.  The people appoint agents to draft and 
propose bills but retain the right to veto bills that are contrary to their interests. 
 
 The U.S. founders rejected direct democracy in favor of a system of representative 
democracy, where people vote for representatives who both propose and vote on bills.  Such a 
system would appear to increase agency costs; why then was it selected? 
 
 There are a number of problems with the Roman system.  First, the direct democracy 
component of it did not really eliminate agency costs.  Magistrates still had agenda setting 
power, enabling them to propose bills that the public preferred to the status quo but not to any 
number of possible alternative bills.  A small and collegial body, by contrast, can set up rules to 
mitigate agenda-setting.  Second, most Romans were illiterate, and the bills had to be read to 
them.  It is hard to believe that the public was able to understand complex laws, which means 
that magistrates could not propose complex but important laws or (more likely) that people voted 
on laws they did not understand.  Debate involving thousands of people was also impossible, so 
the political contribution of the people was limited.  Third, people could not be, and were not, 
compelled to attend assemblies.  This probably meant that only people with low opportunity 
costs or a special interest in proposed bills attended assemblies.  These people were not 
necessarily representative of the population as a whole, which means that many laws were 
enacted that served special interests rather than the public interest. 
 
 Direct democracy today can be found in some states like California.  Systems of direct 
democracy have a poor reputation for reasons related to the problems with direct democracy in 
Rome.  People often do not understand the proposals they vote on, and may not think carefully 
about how they interact with existing legislation. 
 
C.  The Fall of the Roman Republic 
 
 Republican institutions decayed over the last century B.C.  A series of dictatorships 
interspersed with civil war and periods of renewed assertion by the senate finally ended in 27 
B.C., when Octavian became consul and was granted title of Augustus.  Although the senate 
continued to exist, as did many of the constitutional forms, Augustus had immense political 
power as a result of his wealth, his control of armies, and his popularity.  Over time, he and his 
successors would receive de jure recognition of their imperial authority. 
 
 Many of the ancients blamed the collapse of the Roman republic on decadence and the 
corruption of public morals that resulted from the vast wealth that flowed into Rome its 
conquests.128  Sallust and some modern historians point to changes in military organization.  In 
the earlier Republic, soldiers were recruited from among propertied farmers; in the later 
Republic, commanders (beginning with Marius) recruited them from the proletariat.129  Thanks 
to the immense rewards from a successful military campaign, soldiers transferred their loyalty 
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from the Republic to particular military commanders such as Marius, Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar.  
Polybius and Machiavelli believed that the Roman constitution had lost its “balance” between 
monarchical, aristocratic, and popular elements as a result of the expansion of the power of the 
plebeians.130  In the same spirit, Montesquieu argued that Roman conquests resulted in an influx 
of defeated populations, who did not share the interests of the Romans.131  Modern historians 
concur that Rome’s conquest of foreign countries enriched the wealthy while generating a larger 
class of poor people who were absorbed into the state; the tensions between these classes 
eventually could not be contained in a republican system. 
 
 The historical debate was dominated by the image of the balanced constitution introduced 
by Polybius, who himself drew on themes in Plato, Aristotle, and other philosophers.  But there 
are two problems with the idea of the balanced constitution.  First, it draws on an old notion that 
society is divided into classes that pursue their class interests rather than the modern notion that 
society simply consists of individuals who pursue their self-interest.132  Polybius imagined an 
aristocracy (“the few”) and the common people (“the many”), and an inherent struggle between 
them over social resources.  This is certainly not an accurate picture of society today; it is not a 
good starting point for political analysis even for the ancient world.  People then as now had 
individual projects and ambitions.  They lived in a class system but there is no evidence that the 
classes acted as unified agents.  The classes were relatively fluid.  Many plebeians joined the 
ruling class, becoming “nobles,” a more comprehensive group of wealthy and influential people 
than the “patricians.”  Many patricians sought political power by offering leadership to the 
plebes. 
 
 Second, the idea of balance is ambiguous.  Putting aside the extreme cases of absolute 
monarchy and mob rule, one cannot evaluate the “balance” of a constitution because the different 
elements do not have “weights” that can be compared along a common metric.  When the U.S. 
senate became popularly elected, the many gained at the expense of the few, but did the 
constitution become unbalanced as a result or just more perfectly balanced?  Such a question is 
impossible to answer.  Polybius believed that the Roman constitution became “unbalanced,” as 
the senate lost power to popular assemblies, but one could just as easily argue that the 
constitution became more balanced as otherwise the senate was not adequately checked. 
 
 The better approach is to think about constitutions in terms of whether they generate good 
political outcomes—order, security, prosperity, and the like.  The U.S. founders, although 
captivated by the ancient notion of balance, did make arguments along these lines.  They rejected 
the Roman elements of direct democracy, which resulted in sometimes hysterical and 
inconsistent political outcomes, and favored the senate, which is portrayed as a sober deliberative 
body.133  Hamilton criticized the division of the executive between two consuls because it led to 
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conflict.134  Madison criticized the concentration of separate legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers in individual magistrates because it led to “tyranny.”135 
 
 The conventional wisdom beginning with Polybius is that the Roman constitution failed 
because the public obtained too much power.  It foolishly marginalized the senate—the only 
continuous deliberative body—and put its faith in demagogues and tyrants.  However, the 
opposite view seems more plausible.  The senate refused to acknowledge that a de facto shift in 
political power had occurred as a result of the expansion of the population, and insisted on 
maintaining its de jure privileges rather than yielding constitutional power to the people, except 
in small grudging squibs.  The elites became vastly wealthier during the time period as a result of 
conquest, which produced an influx of valuable goods including slaves that accrued mostly to the 
upper class.  The increase in the number of slaves both increased the value of farmland, which 
was mostly held by the elites, and reduced the value of free labor, resulting in the reduction of 
wages and unemployment.  Meanwhile, many Roman soldiers lost their farms as a result of war, 
political disruption, and their long tenure in the field.  All this exacerbated the conflict between 
the lower and upper classes.  To maintain power, the elites would have had to (for example) 
allow the senate to become a more representative body that reflected the interests and enjoyed 
the loyalty of the masses.  The senate also kept the magistrates weak because it feared that 
powerful magistrates would redistribute wealth to the people; but in the process it also failed to 
give magistrates the power to keep order and prosecute wars in an efficient manner.  All of this 
gave rise to a demand for powerful figures who would serve the interests of the masses and 
engage in efficient governance.  A number of individuals saw the opportunity to obtain power by 
appealing to the masses and adopting redistributive programs.  These included Tiberius and 
Gaius Gracchus from roughly 132-121 B.C.; Gaius Marius, who was consul seven times between 
107 and 86 B.C.; Lucius Sergius Catilina and Publius Clodius Pulcher in succeeding years; and 
Julius Caesar, who was consul in 59 and then consul or dictator from 49 to his assassination in 
44 B.C.  It seems apparent that, backed by soldiers and plebes, these individuals had political 
power that greatly exceeded the constitutional authority that they could obtain.  Because the 
senate and other vested interests blocked peaceful constitutional change, constitutional change 
occurred through violence. 
 
 The transition to absolute monarchy is treated as a tragic failure of self-government, but it 
should also be kept in mind that the monarchy ended the civil wars, kept the peace, and initiated 
a new era of conquest and prosperity for the Romans.  It may well be the case that monarchy was 
the better constitutional form for the times—for a much larger and more diverse Rome than 
existed in the first few centuries of the Republic.  After all, monarchy would be the dominant 
constitutional form for large states for the next two millennia, so it is likely that it had significant 
advantages over the republican form of government.  It seems likely that as Rome became more 
populous and heterogeneous, the cumbersome republican system could not arrange transfers 
from policy winners to policy losers whenever the government created a new public good.  Too 
many veto points blocked the way.  A dictator can more easily arrange for transfers, and can stay 
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in power as long as he makes sufficient transfers to the policy losers.136  The major cost of 
dictatorship—that the dictator favors a clique of supporters—may have been tolerable when the 
alternative was either gridlock or anarchy and civil war.  Maintaining order requires constant 
vigilance, and flexibility that allows one to redeploy resources whenever a new threat arises.  
The Republic did not have a powerful enough executive once it exceeded a certain size; by 
dividing executive power among multiple offices and institutions, it created a system that was 
too cumbersome to react to new threats as they arose. 
 
 
Conclusion: Lessons for the U.S. Constitution 
 
 The founders of the U.S. constitution were deeply knowledgeable about the constitution 
of the Roman Republic and heavily influenced by it.137  They accepted Polybius’s view that if a 
constitution is not balanced, the political system will degenerate into tyranny or mob rule,138 but 
they rejected the particular checks and balances of the Roman constitution.  Instead, they were 
persuaded by Montesquieu, and their own experiences with the state governments, that the better 
approach was to divide the government into legislative, executive, and judicial branches that had 
the power to check each other and the institutional motivation to maintain their authority. 
 
 With the benefit of centuries of research not available to the founders, one might worry 
that the founders took the checks and balances of the Roman constitution too literally.  Many 
historians attribute the success of the Romans to the relatively coherent class of elites, who had a 
common worldview (emphasizing conquest and imperial expansion) and could buy off the 
masses through patron-client relationships and occasional redistributive laws and political 
institutions.  The key to success, then, was a small, homogenous population—where everyone in 
the political class knew each other, and everyone could observe what everyone else was doing as 
they were doing it, at least within the confines of Rome.  It was the expansion of the population 
after the Social Wars that finally destroyed Republican Rome, and required the replacement of 
Republican institutions with the dictatorship. 
 
 The upshot is that an elaborate system of checks and balances might not be easily 
transferable to the United States, which even during the founding was vastly larger, more 
populous, and more heterogeneous than Rome was—and today, is even more so.  Of course, 
Madison, influenced by Montesquieu’s skepticism about large republics, worried about this 
problem; federalism was supposed to be the solution.  And indeed state constitutions did not 
fetishize the separation of powers as much as the national constitution did.  Over time, the 
independence of the judiciary diminished in the states—judicial terms in nearly all states have 
been relatively short, and electoral systems in most states kept judges in check—and party 
politics overcame institutional checks and balances.  So an institutional weak national 
government sat atop institutionally powerful state governments.  But federalism has eroded in the 
United States under the pressure of scale economies that favor a national market and national 
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security.  Today, separation of powers is a source of frustration for both left and right, who take 
turns blaming courts and Congress for impeding the policy agenda of the president, and a 
frequent target in the academic literature.139  The development of Rome from a Coasean system 
where the checks and balances established political entitlements that could easily be traded 
among a small political elite, to one where they caused gridlock in a vast, heterogeneous 
population, provides a cautionary tale for the United States.  Indeed, these features of the United 
States account for the erosion of separation of powers in the twentieth century.140  Fortunately, 
we have advantages that the Romans lacked—notably, a free press, a wealthy, educated 
citizenry, a robust party system, and a widely respected norm of political equality that extends 
throughout the entire population.  These hard-won cultural endowments have taken up the slack 
left by the relaxation of the archaic system of checks and balances we have inherited from the 
Romans.141 
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